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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation, et al.,
Defendants,
OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS &
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS
COMP ANY, a corporation, RICHARD
P. GARRICK, BOISE CASCADE
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10516

RESPONDENT'S ANS\VER AND BRIEF TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING
In answer to appellants' petition for rehearing,
respondent respectfully submits that this Court is
not in erro1· in its opinion in this cause, filed February 27, 1967, and appellants' petition should not be
granted, but instead should be dismissed for the
i·easons set forth below in this brief.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only comments that need be made on appellants' statement of facts are first, that it is not
a statement of facts, but an argument, and second,
that as an argument it incorrectly states the basis
of the Court's decision.

POINT I.
THE POINTS RAISED IN APPELLANTS'
PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING
WERE FULLY CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT
AND ARE APPROPRIATELY REFLECTED IN
ITS OPINION. THIS COURT IS NOT IN ERROR
IN ITS OPINION IN THIS CAUSE AND APPELLANTS' PETITION SHOULD ACCORDINGLY
BE DISMISSED.
A. ALL PROVISIONS OF THE MORTGAGE
AND LOAN AGREEMENT WERE OBVIOUSLY
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT ADVANCES MADE PURSUANT THERETO WERE OBLIGATORY.
The sole basis of appellants' petition for rehearing rests on the premise that this Court failed to
consider the loan documents governing the subject
mortgage transaction. Each of the points raised by
appellants has no substance apart from this patently
unfounded assumption.
Appellants again refer to certain provisions of
the loan agreement covering the disbursement procedure and the rights of the parties in the event of
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default.' It hardly appears necessary to point out to
this Court that the major portions of appellants' and
respondent's briefs and oral arguments both here and
in the District Court were directed to these provisions relative to the obligatory v. optional advance
issue.
This Court has made specific reference in its
opinion both to the loan agreement and the rights
of the parties under it. And, in affirming the District Court, the Court answered the contention of
appellants in terms that clearly preclude the raising
of further question on this point, viz.:
"Under the construction loan agreement Western was obligated to pay out the funds as the building progressed."
Yet appellants now suggest that provisions in
the loan agreement were "possibly inadvertently
overlooked" by this Court in reaching its conclusion.
Respondent submits that the opinion of this Court
manifestly shows this assertion to be without substance, that the result reached is in accord with the
p1·eviously stated position of this Court in Utah
Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d
355, 366 P.2d 598 (1961) and places Utah squarely
in line with the prevailing view of other jurisdictions
1. Appellants claim on pages 6 and 7 of their brief for rehearing
that aflvances after default were admittedly voluntarily incurred
and admittedly volitional expenditures. Appellants are in error on
two counts. Both in law and in fact, such disbursements were not
voluntary nor volitional. Second, neither the respondent, the District
Court nor this Court has made any such admission, but on the
\'ontrary have denied their voluntary nature and determined such
disbursements to be obligatory.
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on similar facts. Respondent suggests that the appellants, perhaps inadvertently, have simply failed
to take proper note of this Court's opinion.
It should also be pointed out that appellants continue to cite W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure and Balch
v. Chaffee as authority for their position. As noted
in respondent's brief, these cases both involve other
types of mortgages, not construction mortgages, and
are not in point. The McClure case in fact has specifically been held inapplicable to construction mortgages. See E. K. Vv ood Lmnber Co. v. Jlllulholland,
5 P.2d 669 (Cal. App. 1931) and respondent's brief
pages 12 through 14.
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
RULE OF Utah Savings & Loan Association v.
Mecham TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

In the last paragraph of their statement of
facts, appellants state that this Court based its decision in material part upon the view that the construction loan agreement here was the same as the
agreement in Utah Savings & Loan Association v.
Mecham. Actually, what the Court did say on this
point was:
"We see no distinction between the mortgage
in Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham and
the mortgage before us in this case."
This Court was correct in so holding; for, in
point of fact, Utah Savings involved progress pay-
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ments under a construction mortgage recorded prior
to the commencement of work on the structure, as
do the facts of this case. In Utah Savings the Court
determined that advances under the construction
mortgage were obligatory and entitled to priority
as of the date the mortgage was recorded. In the
present case, this Court made the same finding with
respect to funds advanced under the mortgage and
loan agreement.
All that the lender in the instant case did was
to provide in writing for the same discretion that
is enjoyed by every lender under a construction mortgage. The application of the Utah Savings rule to
the facts of the instant case was entirely proper and
consistent. The fact that a written rather than an
oral agreement to advance funds was present only
strengthens the conclusion arrived at by this Court.
Thus, when the Court stated it could see no distinction between the mortgage in Utah Savings & Loan
Association v. Mecham and the mortgage in this case,
it did not mean that the wording of the loan documents was exactly the same, but rather there was
no legal distinction between the loan documents in
the two cases, i.e., that the loan documents in both
cases provided for obligatory advances. With this
the respondent agrees.
C. NO RELIANCE AS SUCH WAS MADE
BY THE COURT UPON THE PROVISION IN
THE MORTGAGE THAT IT SHALL ALSO SECURE ADDITIONAL LOANS THEREAFTER
MADE. RATHER, THE COURT PROPERLY
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CONSIDERED THE EFFECT OF THIS CLAUSE
AND THE CONTEXT OF THE LOAN TRANSACTION AS A WHOLE. THE COURT REACHED
THE CORRECT RESULT AND COMMITTED NO
ERROR.
The mortgage provision referred to is a common one and appears in many mortgages, including
construction mortgages. Its purpose is to extend the
lien of the basic mortgage to supplemental loans in
addition to the face amount, generally evidenced by
a separate promissory note. The lender is ordinarily
not obligated to make such additional loan since it
is in excess of the face amount of the mortgage and
is therefore considered to be optional.
In Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham
the Court noted that no such provision appeared in
the mortgage; hence, the issue involved only advances
made for the erection of improvements, which the
Court determined to be obligatory.
Under the facts of the instant case the mortgage
does contain a clause for additional advances. The
Comt again found the ad,'ances made under the construction m01tgage to be obligatory. It was therefore
prnper fo1· the Court to consider the effect of the
additional advance provision in light of the contention made by appellants. However, as stated by the
Court, no such additional loans were made, and therefore the Court vvas not relying on this provision in
holding that the advances made under other provisions were obligatory and p1·i01· to appellants' mechanics' liens. \Vhy appellants suggest that the Court
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relied on an obviously and admittedly optional loan
provision in holding the advances obligatory is puzzling to respondent.
Moreover, it is apparent from the Court's opinion that it did not rely on this provision. The Court
stated that "under the construction loan agreement
Western was obligated to pay out the funds as the
building progressed." The decision was based on the
terms of the construction loan agreement and not
on the "additional loans" provisions of the mortgage
as suggested by appellants.
The Court correctly held that the mortgage in
this case, being for a single fixed amount, and the
respondent being obligated to expend the funds in
accordance with the agreement, and no funds having
been disbursed in excess of the face amount, was
prior to the subsequent mechanics' liens of appellants.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, respondent respectfully prays
that appellants' petition for rehearing be denied for
the reason that a reconsideration of the Court's opinion is entirely unwarranted and unnecessary and
would only cause further delay and loss to respondent
without any change in the end result.
Respectfully submitted,
HALLIDAY &HALLIDAY
BY: -------------------------------------Paul M. Halliday
400 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Ralph J. Marsh
1111 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Wes tern Mortgage Loan
Corporation

